Russia holds firm after the Abu Dhabi talks as Iran waits on Washington
Russia will negotiate only on the security architecture of Europe as a whole. Iran says the ball is in the US camp.
At a glance
- Russia and Ukraine
- This week, the United States, Ukraine and Russia held trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi. Russia made clear that it would only negotiate on the security architecture of Europe as a whole, while the Western side came only to ask for a ceasefire, as the situation on the ground turns sharply against Ukraine. Kushner and Witkoff then travelled to Moscow to put their case to Putin directly, and were told in even firmer terms that Russia will make no concessions until the entire security architecture of Europe is negotiated. The Europeans are not even in the room where their own future is being discussed.
- A matter of years
- The idea that such a renegotiation could happen in a matter of weeks reflects either naïveté or a lack of good faith on the American side. Even with every party acting in good faith, it would take years. The talks are either political theatre on the American side, or a serious misjudgement.
- Iran
- Nothing fundamental has changed. Despite rumours of secret meetings and last-minute deals, the Iranian position is the same as it has been since the MoU: the United States signed a deal and must fulfil its seven conditions. The ball is now in the US camp: resume all-out war, or accept defeat and move towards a sustainable peace. What has changed is that Iran is cooperating ever more closely with Russia. As usual, the wild card remains Israel.
Russia, Ukraine and the Abu Dhabi talks
The bigger picture
The Russia-Ukraine war might more accurately be called the Russia-NATO war. As I explained in my previous brief, Russia has made clear that it will only enter talks on the security architecture of Europe as a whole, and that it will not consider any pause in the war in Ukraine until this issue is resolved. In the Russian view, this is the underlying cause of the war: NATO expansion, and the use of Ukraine by Western powers against Russia.
Ce que nous écrivions en octobre “With prospects for substantive talks limited, the coming winter could be exceptionally hard for Ukrainians.” Geopolitical Outlook: Middle East and Ukraine →Recent developments and analysis
This week, the United States, Ukraine and Russia held trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi. Across the table from Russia, the United States, the Ukrainian government and the Europeans (whom the Russians sent out of the room, as discussed below) came only to ask for a ceasefire and de-escalation, as the situation on the ground turns sharply against Ukraine. Three points stand out.
First, Western media coverage and Western government statements continue to suggest that Ukraine may in fact be winning the war, and that Russia is suffering enormous casualties. Yet it is the Western camp that is asking for a ceasefire.
Second, the Western camp has not put a single peace proposal on the table; it is only asking for a ceasefire. This suggests its intent is essentially a repeat of the earlier talks and agreements, all the way back to Minsk, which served to pause hostilities while Russia has the advantage, only to rearm and continue the war. France, the United Kingdom and Germany have also said that they are waiting for a ceasefire to send troops to Ukraine immediately. Russia has made clear that any such troops would be treated as enemy combatants.
Third, the Western delegation, led by Kushner and Witkoff, was shocked to realise during the two days of negotiations that Russia was not prepared to give ground. The Europeans, in fact, still entertain the idea that Russia is a paper tiger and, with sufficient pressure, will soon collapse.
Confident in their own diplomatic skill, Kushner and Witkoff asked, immediately after the meeting, to speak to Putin directly in Moscow. This is a highly unusual step. Going over the heads of the senior negotiators sent to the talks, in order to “speak to the boss”, is a breach of diplomatic practice that the other side can only take as a slight. Predictably, it did not end well. In Moscow, they found Medinsky, Russia’s chief negotiator in Abu Dhabi, in the room with Putin once again, and were told again, in even firmer terms, that Russia would make no concessions whatsoever, and that there was nothing to discuss on Ukraine until the security architecture of Europe as a whole had been negotiated.
On Ukraine itself, the Russians said that wherever the Russian flag has been raised, it will not come down, and that all territories considered Russian would be taken by force if necessary: an extremely hard line.
A negotiation that would take years
The idea that the security architecture of Europe could be renegotiated in a matter of weeks shows how badly the American side misjudges what is at stake. The Americans are there mainly because President Trump is under pressure and wants a visible success in the coming weeks, before he meets Xi Jinping and Putin.
The Russians know this well: even if every party in the room agreed, acted in good faith, committed enough people and genuinely wanted a comprehensive security architecture for Europe, one in which Russia’s security concerns are respected, Ukraine has its own guarantees, the Europeans have theirs, and every party has a real say in how the continent’s security is organised, this would take years.
The Europeans, moreover, oppose any of this. They do not want to discuss it at all, least of all with Russia. In my view, this position is untenable: it amounts to saying that one of the most powerful countries in the world has no say in its own security, and should simply accept what Europeans decide for it.
Europe shut out of the room
Where does this leave Europe? The Europeans are not even in the room where their own future is the main subject of discussion. They have weakened their own position over the years to the point that the Russians refuse to have them at the table: they speak of peace only on terms that would require Russia’s complete capitulation, which is unrealistic. Putin has said that they have not presented a single peace offer since 2022. They have therefore shut themselves out of the process, perhaps until more pragmatic and less confrontational governments take office in Paris, Berlin or London.
On the ground, Russia keeps the pressure very high with its heavy bombing campaign and the dismantling of Ukraine’s critical energy and other infrastructure.
Iran: the ball is in the US camp
The bigger picture
On the Iran war, nothing fundamental has changed. Many rumours and false reports have circulated, along with attempts to move markets on the back of a supposed deal. The Iranian position is the same as it has been since the MoU. The MoU set out conditions to be fulfilled, and Iran is standing by them: in its view, the United States signed a deal and simply needs to honour it. Until the United States fulfils these seven conditions, Iran sees no reason to talk.
Recent developments and analysis
Reports of US Vice President JD Vance meeting Mohsen Rezaei, of secret meetings, of a last-minute Qatari deal or of a secret channel through Pakistan are either exaggerated or unfounded. The Iranians have said so repeatedly. On 10 November, Foreign Minister Araghchi denied any plan for such a meeting, and Rezaei himself publicly rejected what he called fake news about imaginary talks. Iran has said there is no point in talking to anyone until the United States fulfils its side of the deal it has already signed.
It is now up to the United States to decide whether to resume all-out war alongside Israel, or to accept defeat and move towards a sustainable peace.
The end of “no peace, no war”
Iran has said that it will no longer accept this permanent state of no peace, no war. As I have written in every brief on the Iran war since the MoU, it is in the US interest to control the escalation ladder and set the pace of the war, as it has done for decades, and it is doing the same now. In 2025, the United States began bombing in the middle of negotiations, stopped when Iran struck back, and declared victory. It started again in February 2026, again during negotiations. It has since stopped, started again, stopped once more, and is now considering starting again. This is not tenable, and it is not in Iran’s interest.
The United States pursues the same strategy against Russia in Ukraine: it attacks when it chooses, and calls for ceasefires and peace talks when it is in difficulty, so that it can rearm, regroup, find new strategies and attack again when it suits its political agenda or the markets.
The Supreme Leader has made clear that he will no longer tolerate this. If it comes to all-out war, Iran can use its stockpile of hundreds, even thousands, of missiles and drones against US interests in the region, or against US allies in the GCC states. Iran has also recently lifted its self-imposed cap on missile range, and now allows itself to strike US bases in Europe or in any other theatre.
This matters because Iran has shown that it has the capacity to do so. It can manufacture advanced missiles, and extending their range would not be a problem. Iran has repeatedly shown that its capabilities have been underestimated, and it has the full backing of China and Russia. If all-out war breaks out again, the destruction Iran inflicts on the region, and perhaps beyond, will be far greater than before.
Russia’s open backing
One notable development is that Iranian leaders held two direct discussions with Putin immediately after the US midterms. First, Putin had a very long phone call with Mohsen Rezaei, the Supreme Leader’s representative, which is highly unusual for Putin. Rezaei then flew to Moscow to meet Putin in person, in a meeting that lasted three hours, which is both unusually long and very rare.
As a head of state, Putin normally meets only heads of state. Here, Rezaei met Putin directly, and the length of the meeting points to a genuinely deep cooperation between Russia and Iran. What was discussed is not known, but it is reasonable to assume that it included how to counter US military operations.
In the Iran war, then, nothing has fundamentally changed, except that Iran now has the even more open and complete backing of Russia, and also of China. The ball is now in the US camp.
The Israeli wild card
As usual, the wild card remains Israel. No one can be sure whether Israel will act alone and try to draw the United States in. Having failed to secure a majority in the elections, Netanyahu leads a caretaker government until a new one is formed. He may also find a way to declare the elections unsatisfactory or unfair, and call new ones. Until then, he is in a dangerous position: he could decide to attack Iran on his own, or find ways to draw the United States in. According to press reports, Netanyahu calls President Trump every day to make the case for a new war.
Two conflicts, one choice for Washington
In Ukraine as in Iran, the picture is therefore the same: neither Moscow nor Tehran will accept another temporary pause on Washington’s terms. Both have set out their conditions, and the choice between a genuine settlement and a wider war now rests with the United States. Whatever Washington decides, both conflicts will be remembered as major turning points in the fading of US global hegemony.
The views expressed are those of the author at the date of publication, are based on public reporting and do not necessarily reflect the official position of GYRA SA. Forward-looking statements are based on current assumptions and are subject to change without notice. This is not investment advice.